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Editor’s note
For the last CentrePiece of the year and the millennium we
have an appropriate mix of articles: some look back, trying
to understand changes which have taken place; the
majority look forward, reporting on cutting-edge research
which has important lessons for policymakers. 
The argument about why British industry performed so
disappointingly in the second half of this century is a long-
running one; and it’s a subject we’ve touched on in
CentrePiece before. Now Geoffrey Owen sets out his
views which represent several years of research at the
CEP. Attitudes to Europe played a crucial part, he argues.
But Michael West and his colleagues have discovered
other important factors affecting the success of
companies. How a company’s top managers work together
can have a major impact on profitability: their research
specifically relates to the large on-going survey of small
and medium-size manufacturing companies in the UK: but
we can all think of much bigger companies which have
been harmed by poor teamwork at the top!
David Marsden argues that the open-ended contractual
relationship between most firms and their workers is now
due for an overhaul as work patterns change. He offers
some suggestions for how a new relationship might work.
Rachel Griffith, Stephen Redding and John Van Reenen
also have prescriptions to offer. Their research has shown
that increased spending on R&D can bring big rewards for
economies trying to close the productivity gap: not just by
improving innovation performance but by helping firms and
economies to copy technological leaders more effectively.
On a less optimistic note, Stephen Machin and Costas
Meghir report on their findings that there is a clear link
between the incidence of crime and low pay.
Our Guest Columnist, Peter Kenen, writes about the
prospects for the new international financial architecture in
the wake of discussions at the Cologne summit this
summer. This is an area of considerable interest for the
Centre for Economic Performance: we held the second of
a series of major international gatherings on this subject in
July and some of the papers from that meeting will be
published shortly.
Last, but hardly least, Danny Quah offers some reflections
on the internet in his regular column on the Weightless
Economy. It’s worth remembering that when this column
started nearly four years ago, there were some raised
eyebrows: now no-one doubts the extent to which the Net is
changing the way we live and the way economies operate.
CentrePiece plans to continue to be at the forefront of
economic thinking in the next millennium. Don’t forget to let
us have your views, by e-mail or by post, to the address 
on this page.
Graham Ingham
THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS 
AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 
HOUGHTON STREET LONDON, WC2A 2AE
Tel: 0171 955 7798   Fax: 0171 955 7671
Homepage: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/
Email: centrepiece@lse.ac.uk
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By the standards of its international competitors, Britain’s industrial
performance after 1945 was poor – industry was slow to change 
and to recognise the need to compete. But change did finally come. 
In his new book, the CEP’s Geoffrey Owen analyses why and how that
change came about. Here he sets the scene.
Empire
Europe
From
to
The delayed Europeanisation of British industry
O
ne of the more remarkable business stories of the
last decade has been the emergence of the
British Steel Corporation as one of the world’s
leading steelmakers. This company was in a
parlous state at the end of the 1970s, making heavy losses
and lagging far behind its Continental counterparts in
productivity. The revival which began at that time involved a
ruthless attack on overmanning and a concentration of
output in the most efficient plants. Another aspect of the
recovery was a strenuous effort to build a stronger market
position in Continental Europe. The recently announced
merger with Hoogovens, the Dutch steel producer, forms
part of this strategy; the combined group will be slightly
larger than its main European rivals, Thyssen Krupp in
Germany, Usinor in France and Luxembourg-based Arbed. 
Learning the hard way
British Steel’s experience,
though exceptional in some
respects, illustrates in micro-
cosm the transition which
British manufacturing as a
whole has gone through since
the second world war – from
protection to competition, and
from Empire to Europe.
Between 1945 and 1967, when the industry was nation-
alised, British steelmakers were operating within a regula-
tory framework which had been established in the early
1930s, after the abandonment of free trade. Imports were
strictly controlled, and prices were set by a government
agency, the Iron and Steel Board. Most of the industry’s
overseas sales went to the Commonwealth and other
sterling area countries. Interest in continental Europe, either
as a market for exports or as a source of raw materials,
was minimal, and this was reflected in the Attlee govern-
ment’s decision, taken in 1950, not to join the European
Coal and Steel Community. The idea that exposure to 
intra-European trade might make the industry more efficient
was not seriously entertained, and this was as true 
of Conservative governments in the 1950s as of their
Labour predecessors.
The next step was nationalisation, which had the effect of
insulating the industry from commercial pressures and of
making it even more vulnerable to political intervention. One
consequence was an over-ambitious expansion strategy
(approved by a Conservative government in 1973), when
an incremental programme of efficiency improvement would
have been more appropriate. There is also not much doubt
that state ownership made British Steel slower to respond
to the mid-1970s worldwide slump in steel demand than a
private-sector industry would have been. All this coincided
with Britain’s entry into the Common Market, leading to a
rapid and sustained increase in imports from the continent.
What was needed was a drastic reorientation of strategy,
focussing on lower costs and higher quality, which would
enable British Steel both to retain a respectable share of the
British market and to increase its sales in what was now
seen as overwhelmingly the most important outlet for
exports, continental Europe. The 1980s began with a three-
month strike, the outcome of which established the princi-
ple, insisted on by British Steel management, that wage
increases would in future be tied to productivity improve-
ments at plant level. Over the next few years profits steadily
improved to the point where British Steel could be success-
fully privatised. Although the company’s financial perfor-
mance since privatisation has been poor (partly because of
the over-valuation of sterling in the early 1990s and again
towards the end of the decade), British Steel remains at or
near the top of the European productivity league.
Industrial isolation...
Two important strands in this
story are the costs of non-
involvement in Europe and the
damage caused by misguided
government intervention. There
are clear parallels with the
motor industry. British car and
truck manufacturers missed out
on the spectacular expansion of intra-European trade
during the 1950s and 1960s. These were the years in
which Volkswagen and Renault surged past the British
Motor Corporation in output, exports and productivity.
Following the creation of the Common Market in 1958, the
two continental companies were competing in a fast-
growing, increasingly integrated market, comparable in size
to that of the US. The British industry was largely isolated
from this process. Until the mid-1960s the bulk of its
exports went to non-European destinations, while the home
market was heavily protected. As late as 1970, when tariffs
between Britain and the EEC had been substantially
by Geoffrey Owen
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The idea that exposure to intra-European trade might make 
the industry more efficient was not seriously entertained, 
and this was as true of Conservative governments in the
1950s as of their Labour predecessors.
reduced through the GATT negotiations, imports accounted
for only 14% of the British car market, compared with 31%
in Germany (see Table 1 above).
...and government
interference
In 1968, the year after British
Steel was nationalised, the
British motor industry was
subjected to a government-
induced reorganisation – the
merger between British Motor
Holdings (BMH) and Leyland
Motors to form the British Leyland Motor Corporation –
which had disastrous consequences. The merger made
the existing problems at BMH harder to solve, and
damaged the healthier parts of the group such as Leyland
trucks and Jaguar cars. The error was then compounded
by the government rescue in 1975. As a state-owned
enterprise, British Leyland was allowed to pursue an
unrealistic strategy, seeking to compete in all sectors of
the car market at a time when specialisation might have
provided a viable basis for survival. At the end of the
1970s the company was virtually bankrupt. 
In this case, unlike steel, rehabilitation required the help of
a foreign partner – first Honda, brought in as a collabora-
tor on new product development in the early 1980s, and
then BMW, which acquired what was left of British
Leyland, now called Rover, in 1997. A central problem
throughout this period has been the company’s weakness
in continental Europe. The big challenge for BMW is to
develop a new range of up-market cars which will estab-
lish Rover for the first time as a serious contender in
Europe; the new R75, built at Cowley and launched
earlier this year, is a promising start.
On the truck side, too, the British motor industry paid a
heavy price for its neglect of Europe in the early post-war
decades. Leyland, the leading producer of heavy trucks,
concentrated almost entirely on Commonwealth and
sterling area customers, and was wholly unprepared for
the opening-up of the European market in the 1970s. The
home market was invaded by such companies as Volvo,
Scania and Mercedes-Benz, and Leyland did not have
suitable vehicles with which to launch a counter-attack.
The sale of Leyland to DAF of the Netherlands in 1988
was a belated recognition of the need for a European
dimension, but by that time a great deal of ground had
been lost, and DAF itself was a weak player in an over-
crowded market. Both Leyland and DAF are now owned
by Paccar, the American truck manufacturer. 
The benefits 
of competition
Paper-making is another indus-
try which illustrates the transi-
tion from Empire to Europe. For
the first fifteen years after the
war British paper companies
were operating in a protected
home market, and they had a
small but profitable export trade with the Commonwealth.
Then, at the end of the 1950s, came the shock of the
European Free Trade Area (EFTA), which exposed them to
competition from countries that had cost and raw material
advantages in paper-making, principally Sweden and
Finland. During the 1960s and 1970s the industry strug-
gled to come to terms with a difficult trading environment,
as it looked for sectors of the market in which UK-based
producers, lacking access to large forests, could build a
viable business. The two biggest British paper companies,
Reed and Bowater, became increasingly dubious about the
future of the UK paper-making operations, and started
diversifying in other directions. 
What then ensued, in the 1980s and 1990s, is one of the
unsung success stories of British business. For a mixture of
reasons, including technical advances in the use of waste
paper as a substitute for imported woodpulp, the prospects
for paper-making in Britain looked rather better than they
had seemed in the depths of post-EFTA gloom. At the
same time the Thatcher government’s reforms were making
the UK a more attractive target for foreign investment.
These developments helped to set in train an extraordinary
transformation of the industry, involving changes in 
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Table 1 Import penetration in cars in West Germany
and Britain 1955-70 (percentage of car sales
supplied by imports in each country)
Britain West Germany
1955 2.2 4.1
1960 7.1 19.0
1965 5.0 18.1
1970 14.4 31.3
Source: Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders, 
Verband der Automobilindustrie
It would be absurd to suggest that all Britain’s industrial problems would have been solved if
governments and companies had taken Europe more seriously in the early post-war years.
As a state-owned enterprise, British Leyland
was allowed to pursue an unrealistic strategy,
seeking to compete in all sectors
of the car market at a time
when specialisation
might have provided a
viable basis for survival.
ownership, the construction of new mills and a marked
improvement in productivity. Reed and Bowater withdrew
from UK paper-making, and their places were taken by
foreign, mainly European, companies which were prepared
to invest on a substantial scale in British mills. In 1967 the
ten top British paper-makers were all British-owned; thirty
years later only two of the top ten were wholly British. Over
the same period exports rose from less than 10 per cent of
production to nearly a quarter, with almost all the increase
coming from continental Europe.
Taking Europe seriously
It would be absurd to suggest
that all Britain’s industrial
problems would have been
solved if governments and
companies had taken Europe
more seriously in the early post-
war years, and if entry into the
Common Market had come in
1958 rather than in 1973. But German and French experi-
ence suggests that intra-European trade was a poweful
force for modernisation and rationalisation, and that, if
Britain had been part of this process, some of the changes
which took place in the 1980s would have occurred much
earlier. The French example is particularly striking. As 
Table 2 below shows, the share of France’s exports going
to the former French colonies fell from 42% in 1952 to
13.5% in 1968, and this was almost exactly matched the
increase in exports to fellow members of the “Six”. This
competitive stimulus was far more important to France’s
economic revival than indicative planning or industrial
policy, both of which were grossly over-praised in Britain
during the 1960s. 
That European stimulus was missing in Britain, and its
absence was compounded by domestic policies which
tended to hold back industrial change in the interests of 
full employment and social peace. Two examples of 
such policies have already been mentioned – the 
nationalisation of steel and the rescue of British Leyland.
They were of a piece with other cases of government 
intervention – sometimes geared to the creation of national
champions – the effect of which was to delay British indus-
try’s adjustment to international competition, and to waste
a great deal of taxpayers’ money in the process. The lack of
enthusiasm for competition was most marked under Labour
governments, but the Conservative record in the field of
industrial policy – before 1979 – is not a glorious one.
Thatcherism’s impact
The significance of Thatcherism
was that the protective blanket
was removed and British indus-
try was forced to compete. With
the partial exception of defence
and aerospace, support for
national champions was
abandoned, and the Thatcher
government was more relaxed than its predecessors about
allowing supposedly strategic industries to pass into foreign
control; no objection was raised when ICL, the computer
company, was sold to Fujitsu of Japan, or when Rover was
sold to BMW. The outcome was a process of specialisation
and internationalisation, as companies sought to concen-
trate on businesses which had a realistic chance of becom-
ing internationally competitive, and withdrew from those
which did not. In some industries, such as electronics,
gaps left by uncompetitive British firms were partially filled
by inward investment. The effect of Thatcherism was to
accelerate British industry’s integration into the world
market and to remove obstacles which stood in the way. 
“If only what happened to us in the 1980s had happened in
the 1950s.” This remark, made to me by a senior industrial-
ist a few years ago, encapsulates the story of Britain’s post-
war industrial performance. To meet the challenge of the
post-war world British industry had to break away from
attitudes and management practices which had taken root
under the protectionist policies of the inter-war years. But
the incentive to make such changes was weaker than in
West Germany or France, where the disasters of the
preceding decade had created a climate much more
conducive to radical reform of institutions and policies.
There was also a political imperative for European integra-
tion which did not exist in Britain.
What was needed in Britain after 1945 was a pro-European
Margaret Thatcher. Whether the political conditions would
have allowed such a figure to emerge, just after the 
victorious conclusion of the war, is another matter.
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Geoffrey Owen, formerly editor of the Financial Times, is a
member of the Centre for Economic Performance and senior
fellow at the LSE’s Inter-disciplinary Institute of Management. His
new book – From Empire to Europe: the decline and recovery of
British industry since the second world war – is published by
HarperCollins.
Table 2 Destination of French exports 1952-73
(percentage of total)
Former French Six EEC Other OECD
Colonies countries countries
1952 42.2 15.9 27.3
1958 37.5 22.2 24.4
1962 20.8 36.8 27.9
1968 13.5 43.0 27.0
1973 9.2 48.6 27.5
Source: W.J.Adams, Restructuring the French economy, 
Brookings 1979, p178
The lack of enthusiasm for competition was most marked under Labour governments, but the
Conservative record in the field of industrial policy – before 1979 – is not a glorious one.
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How important is top management to the success of companies?
New research from the CEP suggests that the team at the top plays 
a crucial role in company profitability.
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I
f the top management team members are well educated,
all around similar ages and have worked together for a
long time, the chances are that a company is relatively
profitable. If these top executives also work well as a
team, having clear objectives, high levels of participation,
a commitment to excellence in their work and support
innovation, the shareholders would have cause to be even
happier. Indeed, our new research study shows that the
composition and functioning of the top team account for a
huge 43% of the variation between companies in profitability.
Education matters 
The research, funded by the ESRC via the Centre for
Economic Performance, has followed the performance of
160 UK manufacturing companies over the last 10 years.
We gathered information from the top management team
members about their backgrounds and their views of their
teams’ functioning and then related this information to the
subsequent performance of the companies. We found that
the best predictor of company profitability and, to a lesser
extent, productivity, was the average educational level of
the team members. Educational level explained 19.4% of
the variance in profitability in different firms and 11.4% of
the variation in productivity.
Those management teams which included executives with
higher educational levels performed best. We asked what
qualifications team members had ranging from ‘O’ levels
up to MBA and PhD. What made the most difference was
at least some team members having a postgraduate qualifi-
cation – a Master’s level degree, a PhD or an MBA (Master
of Business Administration) tended to be the most signifi-
cant. This suggests that investment in MBAs may not
simply be for window dressing but may make a very real
and powerful difference to the performance of the individu-
als and their companies.
When we look at the frequency with which top team
members have various qualifications we see (Figure 1
overleaf) that, even in the 42 relatively small manufacturing
companies (those with an average size of 230 employees)
included in our research, 24% of the sample of 237 top
management team members had MBAs, Master’s level
Apath toprofit?
Teamwork at thetop
By Michael A. West, Malcolm G. Patterson and Jeremy Dawson
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degrees and PhDs. The proportion of people with
postgraduate qualifications in these teams ranged from 0%
(11 teams) to 75% (1 team), with an average of 27.2%.
But how?
There are two explanations for these very striking results.
One is that the most intelligent people (who also happen to
be those who succeed in acquiring high level educational
qualifications) are simply better able to manage the
challenges of running a modern business in a complex,
demanding competitive environment. In the jargon of
psychology, such managers have the cognitive capacity and
flexibility to appraise and react appropriately to their
complex environments. Alternatively, it could be that the
specific training they receive in their MBAs, PhDs and
Masters courses equips them with the specific technical
and managerial skills required for them to do their jobs
more effectively than their less well-educated colleagues –
and make their companies the more profitable. 
It could, of course, be a combination of both of these 
explanations. What we know is not the reason for our
findings is that profitable companies can afford to hire the
better educated (and therefore higher salary demanding)
managers, since we controlled statistically for the size,
sector and prior productivity and profitability of the firms in
our study. This is all good news for Business Schools!
Too young or too old?
We also found that the more members of the top team
differed in their ages, the worse the subsequent profitability
of their companies. This is a puzzling finding and one that
could prompt a putsch of young and old top team members
– an inappropriate response in our view. We speculate that
what lies behind this finding has to do with the notion of
shared mental models in teams: in other words, the extent
to which team members share a similar view of the team’s
task in running the company, interpreting markets, meeting
competition and formulating strategies. The more they
share a ‘world view’ of the task, the easier it is for them to
communicate, collaborate and co-ordinate their efforts and
strategies. Where they have very different views of the
world, they will be more likely to work at cross-purposes,
conflict and compete with each other. And differences in
ages are clearly associated with differences in worldviews. 
People from different age groups have different emotional
reactions too. Older people have more complex emotional
experience (fewer black and white reactions), and tend too
to cope with negative emotions better than younger people.
Overall they tend to have more positive emotions than
younger people and to look for different rewards from
relationships. Older people seek continuity and stability in
their relationships whereas younger people often seek
more for stimulation. These diversities of mental models
and emotions may lead to a failure of those from very differ-
ent age groups to work together as effectively as teams of
senior managers more closely linked in age to promote the
profitability of their companies. 
Figure 1:
Educational qualifications of top management 
team members
No formal qualifiactions 1
‘O’ level; GCSE 20
‘A’ level; ONC 16
HND etc. 63
Graduate 75
Postgraduate 62
Total 237
Educational level of Managing Directors
‘O’ level; GCSE 1
‘A’ level; OND 1
HND etc. 8
Graduate 14
Postgraduate 6
The more they share a ‘world view’ of the task, the easier it is for them to
communicate, collaborate and co-ordinate their efforts and strategies.
The longer the team had worked
together, the more profitable was
the company subsequently.
Learning the right lesson
This does not imply, of course, that we should construct
only age-homogeneous teams. What we must do is train
top team members to work effectively together to achieve
shared understanding and to profit from, rather than waste,
the innovative potential of integrating diverse perspectives
and orientations. Indeed, our work with top management
teams from a range of industrial sectors suggests they
would benefit considerably from training in how to work
effectively in teams.
This is well illustrated by our third important finding about
the composition of the top team. The longer the team had
worked together, the more profitable was the company
subsequently. According to the Managing Directors of the
companies we looked at, the average time the teams had
been together was just over two years, with a range from
one month to over 8 years (see Figure 2 above). Of course
it might be that beyond a certain point this pattern would be
reversed with teams becoming less effective as they
became stale in their approach to their markets. But this is
a question to be addressed in our further research.
Why should longer team tenure lead to better company
performance? Again, we suspect it is to do with shared
approaches to the world and established patterns of
working efficiently together. Those who spend more time
working together and who share a concern with ensuring
improving company performance, find strategies for
working together which lead to more effective collaboration
and integration of efforts. By contrast, newcomers must
learn the foibles of their colleagues and develop effective
means of communication with them. These things take time
and, until effective collaboration with colleagues is estab-
lished, performance suffers.
It’s likely anyway that the characters who make up these
teams may be individualistic, achievement oriented and
competitive – not necessarily the best qualities for team
working. They have risen to the top of companies in male-
dominated environments by dint of career tournaments.
Putting aside the strivings for individual success to meet
the needs of the company and its senior management team
may not always be so easy. So working together over a
period of time may be necessary in order for them to ‘fit’
together as an effective team with shared objectives, inter-
dependent working and a sense of collective responsibility
and accountability.
Making a difference…
Together, these three factors (educational level, age diver-
sity and team tenure) enabled us to predict nearly 18% of
the variation between the companies in productivity and
37% of the variation between companies in profitability
(see Figure 3 below). These are very large percentages of
profitability to be able to account for and suggest the
economic value of considering these factors carefully.
…or not
What didn’t make any difference? The size of the team (the
average was seven members but with a range from four to
fifteen) didn’t. Nor did the age (as opposed to the age
differences) of team members or the time team members
had been in their organisations. The professional
backgrounds of team members had no significant effect
either. Women in the teams we studied were like orchids in
winter – rare and threatened: but of itself, gender had no
discernible impact on company profitability. Frequency of
team meetings also failed to account for any variance.
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Figure 2 Characteristics of top management teams
Average Minimum Maximum
Size of team 7 4 15
Age of members 46 38 54
Members’ time in organisation (months) 77 8 160
Members’ time in industry (months) 187 32 378
Team tenure (months) 25 1 101
Percentage males 96 67 100
Percentage white 96 71 100
Figure 3 Predicting company productivity and profitability
(Percentage of variation accounted for)
Productivity
Prior productivity, firm size, sector 43.2
Educational level, age diversity, team tenure 17.8
Team processes 8.6
Total 69.6
Profitability
Prior profitability, firm size, sector 12.4
Educational level, age diversity, team tenure 37.4
Team processes 16.2
Total 66.0
Most surprising was the apparent absence of any link between job satisfaction and worker turnover;
those dissatisfied at work are no more likely to leave than their more satisfied colleagues.
Questioning the teams
The data we studied on the composition of teams – educa-
tional qualifications and age, for example – are pretty easy
to collect, and we found clear evidence of the impact (or
lack of it) of these factors on corporate profitability. But
such factors don’t tell the whole story. We wanted to
examine more subjective issues such as the functioning of
the teams to see whether these might also have an impact
on a firm’s profitability. So we asked all team members in
our study to complete a questionnaire. We first asked them
to comment on the extent to which they felt team members
were clear about their overall team objectives, the extent to
which they were committed to them and the value of the
team’s vision or objectives. 
We also wanted to know what team members thought of
the levels of participation in the team. This included the
extent to which team members shared information with
each other, whether they felt that all team members had
influence over decisions that were taken, and the frequency
with which team members interacted. This is a question-
naire which we have used in a very wide variety of organis-
tions and which we have validated by comparing video and
audio recordings of team meetings with team members’
questionnaire responses. 
The questionnaire also taps task orientation, or the extent to
which team members monitor each other’s performance, as
well as overall team performance in order to provide
feedback and ensure excellent performance. It includes
questions covering the extent of the commitment to excel-
lence and tries to measure the extent to which the team
incorporates a critical orientation to decision-making and
performance (sometimes called ‘constructive controversy’). 
Finally, the questionnaire seeks to measure support for
innovation – the extent to which team members support
each other’s ideas for new and improved ways of doing
things. Team members are asked whether they feel they get
verbal support for their proposal and, perhaps more impor-
tant, asks if they feel their colleagues offer time, resources
and effort to help implement their proposals for innovation.
We have used this measure in a variety of settings, ranging
from top management teams in BBC TV to NHS Trusts and
primary health care teams: and we have shown that it can
predict the innovativeness and effectiveness of teams as
well as the mental health of team members. 
So how did they do?
Team members in our manufacturing company study
scored well in comparison with teams in other organisa-
tions we have studied, except (alarmingly) in relation to
support for innovation (see Figure 4 above). Their highest
scores were on the scale measuring objectives, and the
lowest on the measure of support for innovation. It may be
that the people who make up these teams are by nature
critical and conservative in their orientations. Intelligent
people usually do bring incisive critical orientations to
problems and proposals. The problem with this approach is
that many young, tender ideas are never nurtured to the
stage of implementation because they are cut down while
still weak. The history of science and the study of success-
ful R & D teams suggests that the most effective are those
which encourage early and reject later. In successful teams,
members tend to look for confirmation and support for each
other’s ideas in the early stages of the process, and only
much later to bring a more critical approach to innovation
proposals which might result in the ultimate rejection of
some of them.
More linkage
Perhaps even more significantly, we found that these team
processes (objectives, participation, task orientation, 
and support for innovation) also predicted company
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Figure 4 Functioning of top management teams
Clarity of and commitment to objectives 3.94 
Participation 3.65
Task orientation 3.51
Support for innovation 3.49
Women in the teams we studied were like orchids in winter – rare and threatened:
but of itself, gender had no discernible impact on company profitability.
productivity and profitability. Again we took out the effects
of prior company performance, so we know it is not that
because the company is doing well that team members
feel they function well together. These team processes
enabled us to predict just over 16% and nearly 9% of the
variation between companies in profitability and productiv-
ity respectively. The clearer the team’s objectives, and the
higher the levels of team participation, task orientation and
support for innovation, the better did the companies
perform. So, both team composition and team processes
predicted performance. 
Of course we looked for overlap between these two sets
of predictors and found that the educational level of team
members did to some extent account for quality of team
functioning. Better-educated teams functioned more effec-
tively in relation to the four team process factors we
described above. The same alternative explanations we
offered apply here too. Perhaps the more intelligent team
members are better able to manage the complexities of
working effectively in a team (and in such a challenging
team as the top management team of a company). The
other explanation (competing or complementary) is that
the education of these team members enabled them to
work more effectively in teams. So perhaps the sessions
on team working or just the general level of skill develop-
ment in MBA and other business-related courses enabled
team members to work together more effectively. This too
is a question for further research.
But when we combined our analyses, we found that
characteristics of top teams (education, age diversity and
team tenure) had effects which were largely independent
of team processes (objectives, participation, task orienta-
tion and support for innovation) in predicting the
profitability and productivity of the companies. Taken
together (and with only with a small degree of overlap)
both groups of factors independently predicted a very
significant variation in companies’ profitability (43%) and
productivity (20%).
A further interesting observation relates to an article we
contributed to Centrepiece a year ago (see ‘People
Power’ CentrePiece Autumn 1998, p2). There we
reported that the average satisfaction level of employees
in companies predicted company productivity, though not
company profitability directly. Here we report that top
management team characteristics predict company
profitability quite strongly, but company productivity
relatively weakly. And this makes sense. Employees
generally have direct control over their work performance
and productivity, but little direct influence over profitability.
Top management teams in contrast have indirect influence
over productivity, but much more direct control over
investment decisions, purchasing decisions, pricing
decisions and competitive strategies (in short, the factors
which most influence profitability). These findings there-
fore have a persuasive symmetry.
The prescription for success
What are the practical implications of our research? First,
make sure that you hire well-educated people to run
companies. It is probably worth spending the money on
MBA-trained people. Second, try to ensure some stability
and continuity in the top team. Third, where there is signifi-
cant age diversity, make sure that the team members
devote more effort than usual to improving communication,
reducing conflict and increasing their level of reflection
about team performance and team functioning. And finally,
encourage team members constantly to reflect, individually
and collectively, upon their team objectives, participation
(communication, decision-making, and meetings), task
orientation (team self-assessment and appraisal, as well as
external feedback), and support for innovation. Reflection
should be accompanied by a resolve to make changes as
appropriate. Such ‘reflexivity’, we have found, is one of the
very best predictors of team functioning in organisations,
but also one of the most neglected strategies for improve-
ment at work.
Ultimately, the profitability of companies depends upon the
skills of the top team, its collective wisdom, and the ability
of the human beings that make up the team to work effec-
tively together for the profitability of the company and the
interests of all its stakeholders. Our research has clearly
demonstrated effective teamwork at the top is critical in
determining whether a company succeeds or fails.
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Many young, tender ideas are never nurtured to the stage of 
implementation because they are cut down while still weak. 
The G-7 governments appear to
believe that they have finished the
task begun at the Halifax Summit in
1995 – refashioning the international
financial system to reduce the risk
and consequences of future financial
crises. In their report to the Cologne
Summit, the G-7 finance ministers
summarised their previous work and
made some new proposals. They
promised to monitor implementation
and “report on progress, as
necessary.” They nevertheless
implied that they have completed the
blueprint and that the masons and
carpenters should take over from 
the architects.
Measured against the rash
promises of some national leaders
and radical proposals of some
academics, the G-7 blueprint is
modest. Measured against the
difficulty of reforming a system in
being – a task far harder than the
one faced by the Bretton Woods
Conference in 1944, which met
while the world was still at war – the
new blueprint is ambitious. It does
not call for razing and rebuilding the
international financial system. It does
propose a major renovation. Yet the
blueprint is long on process and
principles and short on carrots and
sticks.
Those who have followed closely
the official discussion of these
issues, from working group to
working group and summit to
summit, will not find many new ideas
in the G-7 report. Much of the report
lists steps already taken: the
negotiation of the New Arrangements
to Borrow (NAB), the introduction
and recent revision of the Fund’s
Special Data Dissemination Standard
(SDDS), the establishment of the
Financial Stability Forum to facilitate
cooperation among financial
regulators, and the promulgation of
codes and standards aimed at
strengthening the financial systems
of emerging-market countries and
promoting transparency in the
conduct of fiscal, monetary, and
financial policies.
On the difficult issue of
compliance with codes and
standards, however, the report is
vague. It attaches “high priority” to
several steps – but they are tentative.
It asks the IMF to develop a system
to monitor implementation and to use
the codes and standards in
determining Fund conditionality. But
it does not resolve a fundamental
problem. Few countries can be
expected to comply completely with
the codes and standards, and
assessments of compliance will
therefore involve finely calibrated
qualitative judgements. It will be easy
enough to spot egregious
shortcomings and, in determining
conditionality, to require remedial
action. Even in those cases,
however, effective action will take
time – more time than the normal
duration of an IMF program.
The report makes other
recommendations aimed at obtaining
compliance, but they raise similar
problems. Regulators in the industrial
countries are urged to consider a
country’s compliance with the
relevant standards when asked to
approve market entry by that
country’s banks. The revised Capital
Accord proposed by the Basle
Committee would end preferential
risk weighting of short-term loans to
banks in emerging-market countries
and would allow for punitive risk
weighting of loans to banks in
countries that do not comply with the
relevant standards. But where will
the regulators draw the line – how
will they define compliance – and will
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After Cologne 
Peter Kenen examines the G-7 plans 
for international monetary reform which 
were discussed at the Cologne Summit 
this summer.
GUEST COLUMN
The blueprint is long on
process and principles and
short on carrots and sticks.
they agree on the right place to 
draw it?
There is implicit recognition of
these problems elsewhere in the G-7
report and of the time it will take for
countries to comply with the new
codes and standards. It says that
“controls on capital inflows may be
justified” until countries have
strengthened their institutional and
regulatory regimes, and it goes on to
acknowledge that, where those
regimes are weak, it may be
appropriate to limit the foreign-
currency exposure of the banking
system. But it hedges its cautious
approval of capital-inflow controls by
asking the IMF to study further the
benefits and costs of those controls.
It is by now widely agreed that
pegged or quasi-pegged exchange
rates played a pernicious role in the
evolution of recent crises. In the run-
up to the Asian crisis, they
encouraged the imprudent
accumulation of foreign-currency
debt. With the onset of the crisis,
they encouraged an excessive draw-
down of reserves, which then made
it impossible for the crisis-stricken
countries to keep their currencies
from going into free-fall. In the wake
of the crisis, large currency
depreciations combined with large
foreign-currency debts to produce
widespread insolvencies in the
financial and corporate sectors, 
and these in turn contributed
importantly to the sharp contractions
of output that occurred in many
crisis-stricken countries.
Yet previous G-7 reports and
those of other official bodies said
very little about exchange-rate
arrangements. The report to the
Cologne Summit is cautiously
agnostic but bolder than any
previous report. While the
appropriate exchange-rate regime for
a particular country will depend on
the country’s own circumstances and
may vary over time, “the international
community should not provide large-
scale official financing for a country
intervening heavily to support a
particular exchange-rate level” unless
the level is deemed to be sustainable
and certain other conditions are met.
Previous reports dealt at length
with the need for private-sector
involvement in the resolution of
financial crises, but the G-7 report is
more explicit and detailed, despite
the need to blend an American
insistence on a case-by-case
approach with a European
preference for a rule-based
approach. In some cases, it says,
emphasis might best be placed on
voluntary, market-based solutions. In
others, however, more “coercive”
solutions may be required. The use
of “coercive” is new, moreover,
redressing the strong bias in favour
of voluntary approaches found in the
G-22 report published in autumn
1998, just after the Russian default.
Having stressed the need for
differentiation, moreover, the report
lists the “tools” available to the
international community, involving
increasingly coercive solutions. The
provision of official financial support
could be linked to efforts by a crisis-
stricken country to open discussions
with its creditors, efforts to seek
voluntary commitments from its
creditors, efforts to seek specific
creditor commitments to maintain
exposure levels, and efforts to
restructure or refinance the country’s
outstanding debt. A country seeking
official assistance might be required
to agree to a reserve floor, effectively
forcing private-sector creditors to
accept a restructuring of their claims.
In exceptional cases, a country may
even impose capital controls to
achieve a payments suspension or
standstill.
Finally, the G-7 report edges
closer to implementing a
recommendation made initially in
1996 by the so-called Rey Report –
the inclusion in sovereign debt
contracts of “collective-action-
clauses” aimed at facilitating creditor
coordination and discouraging
disruptive action by dissident
creditors. It recommends that
inclusion of those clauses be
regarded as “best practice” in the
management of sovereign debt and
as a determinant of eligibility for a
Contingent Credit Line from the IMF.
It also recommends “consideration”
of two more possibilities – including
collective-action-clauses in sovereign
debt contracts enhanced by
multilateral development banks 
and “possible inclusion” of those
clauses in the debt instruments of
the G-7 countries themselves – but
stops short of promising that this 
will be done.
Is there thus reason to hope that
the official community is ready at last
to close the gap between its rhetoric
and actual behaviour?
The Rey Report endorsed the
same general principles contained in
the current G-7 report. Written soon
after the Mexican crisis, it warned
debtor countries and their private
creditors not to expect “to be
insulated from adverse financial
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Few countries can be
expected to comply
completely with the 
codes and standards, 
and assessments of
compliance will therefore
involve finely calibrated
qualitative judgements.
But where will the regulators
draw the line – how will
they define compliance – 
and will they agree on the
right place to draw it?
It is by now widely agreed
that pegged or quasi-pegged
exchange rates played a
pernicious role in the
evolution of recent crises.
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It’s widely accepted that the most
innovative – and productive –
economies are those which spend
most on research and development.
But new research at the CEP
suggests there’s another 
important way in which 
R & D can bring about 
productivity improvements, 
by enhancing the 
ability to imitate. New!
with extra imitation
New!
Borrowed ideas
by Rachel Griffith, Stephen Redding, and John Van Reenen 
15
T
here’s an old joke which says that whenever two
economists get together they will have three
opinions between them. Yet there is a remarkable
degree of consensus on some of the factors
which have been responsible for Britain’s disap-
pointing post-war economic performance. Again and again,
the poor productivity record of the UK comes up as a criti-
cal failing. In the past twenty years there have been
enormous absolute improvements in Britain’s productivity
performance. There has been an improvement in relative
performance. Nevertheless the level of UK productivity still
lags behind that in the US and some continental European
economies in most industries. This may be the result of a
number of factors: underinvestment in physical and human
capital, as well as in ideas. 
More spending on research and development (R&D) will
boost productivity through innovation: that much is now
widely accepted. But our new research offers strong
evidence that R&D can also improve productivity by helping
firms and economies to benefit from advances already
made elsewhere. This has important implications not just
for the UK economy but for many other industrial and devel-
oping countries.
The productivity gap
Productivity in the UK manufacturing sector still lags well
behind levels in the United States and some continental
European economies. A report from the McKinsey Global
Institute in 1998 found that manufacturing productivity in
the United Kingdom was approximately 60% of that in the
United States, for example. Productivity is an important
determinant of per capita income and its growth, so this
gap matters. Closing it, or at least narrowing it, could bring
increases in income per capita in the future – although in
order to do so we may have to invest today for gains tomor-
row. The UK government has set up a new Performance
and Innovation Unit – located in the Cabinet Office – to
tackle this problem directly.
Traditionally, the principal contribution of R&D activity has
been judged to be in helping firms – and economies – stay
at the technological frontier: to help them keep ahead of the
competition. Productivity improvements inevitably flow from
such advancements. Yet more recently, some theoretical
studies have suggested that R&D may contribute to
productivity improvements in another way – by helping firms
to copy what others have already achieved. The term
’absorptive capacity’ is used to illustrate a firm’s ability to
understand and then assimilate what other competing firms
have already achieved, and more spending on R&D might
be thought to increase this. (As every researcher knows a
large part of one’s own research time is spent on finding
out what other people have already done!) At the interna-
tional level, R&D may thus have an important part to play in
helping economies catch up with the leaders. Since most
studies have tended to focus solely on the effects of R&D
on innovation, they may underestimate the wider potential
benefits of R&D.
The two faces of R&D
The idea that innovation is an important source of productiv-
ity growth goes back to the writings of Joseph Schumpeter
in the 1940s. He argued that the prospect of monopoly
profits provided the incentive for private firms or individuals
to invest resources in trying to discover or develop new
technologies. These ideas have recently been formalised in
the body of research on growth, where innovation can mean
either the introduction of new product varieties or succes-
sively higher qualities of an existing product – both of which
will lead to productivity improvements.
Innovation is important. But productivity improvements can
also come from imitation or technology transfer (between
firms or economies), and indeed may be a more important
source of such improvements for economies not at the
technological frontier. Nathan Rosenberg argues that three
of the great technical developments in European history –
printing, gunpowder, and the compass – are all instances of
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successful technological transfer. He goes on to say that ’It
may be seriously argued that, historically, European recep-
tivity to new technologies, and the capacity to assimilate
them whatever their origin has been as important as inven-
tiveness itself.’
But technology transfer is not necessarily automatic and is
contingent on levels of knowledge and expertise in the firm,
industry, or country to which the technology is being trans-
ferred. Some knowledge is ‘tacit’ or hard to acquire without
direct experience. By actively engaging in research and
development in a particular intellectual or technological
field, one acquires such tacit knowledge and can more
easily understand and assimilate the discoveries of others.
Even then, the transfer of technology may be far from
automatic. Take the example of the jet engine: when plans
were supplied by the British to the Americans during the
Second World War, it took ten months for them to be
redrawn to conform to American usage. In other words,
R&D is as crucial for technology transfer as for innovation.
Figure 1 (below) shows the two routes by which investment
in R&D can generate productivity improvements. In all
economies behind the technological frontier, innovation and
technology transfer each constitute potential sources of
productivity growth. If an economy already possesses the
state of art technology, innovation provides the sole source
of productivity growth. Investments in R&D now only affect
productivity growth in so far as they generate innovations.
In practice, of course, some economies may be behind the
technological frontier in some areas and at it in others.
Putting flesh on the bones
That’s the theory: where’s the evidence? We set out to test
the viability of the framework outlined by using data on
fourteen sectors in twelve OECD countries since 1970.
These are listed in Table 1 below. We looked at data on
productivity growth, a measure of the potential for technol-
ogy transfer, and a way of quantifying the contribution of
R&D to innovation and technology transfer.
Our measure of productivity growth is based upon the idea
that there is a production function determining the number
of units of output produced for a given level of inputs of
factors of production. Output will grow as conventional
inputs – labour and capital – grow. But output growth will
also depend on how efficiently people and machines are
used together. This measure of efficiency is called ‘total
factor productivity’ (TFP).
Figure 1: Innovation, Technology Transfer, and R&D
Panel A: An economy behind the technological frontier
Panel B: An economy that already possesses the state of the
art technology.
Productivity Growth
R & D
Innovation Technology Transfer
Productivity Growth
R & D
Innovation
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Countries
1. Canada
2. Denmark
3. Finland
4. France
5. Germany
6. Italy
7. Japan
8. Netherlands
9. Norway
10. Sweden
11. United Kingdom
12. United States
Table 1: List of industries and countries used 
in the empirical study
Industries
1. Food, beverages and tobacco
2. Textiles, apparel and leather
3. Wood products and furniture
4. Paper and printing
5. Chemical products
6. Non-metallic minerals
7. Primary metals
8. Fabricated metals 
9. Metal products
10. Non-electrical machinery
11. Electrical machinery
12. Transport equipment 
13. Instruments 
14. Other manufacturing
Traditionally, the principal contribution of R&D activity
has been judged to be in helping firms – and
economies – stay at the technological frontier.
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The policy debate has thus far largely been concerned with
labour productivity (as measured for example by output per
hour worked). While straightforward and intuitive, this is a
measure of the productivity of one factor of production
alone. It doesn’t tell us whether output per worker is high
because of the high levels of inputs (eg capital) or because
of high levels of technical efficiency (TFP).
TFP by contrast provides a measure of the productivity of
all factors of production. Even with fairly general assump-
tions about the nature of the technological relationship and
market structures, it is possible to measure the rates of
productivity growth in the individual industries of a particu-
lar country. We have used a measure that essentially
compares the rate of growth of output with the rate of
growth of factor inputs, where the rate of growth of each
factor input is separately and appropriately weighted.
We measured the potential for technology transfer by the
size of the technology gap – the distance between each
economy’s level of productivity in a particular industry and
the level at the technological frontier in that industry. There
are a number of ways in which in principle one might
model the technological frontier. Perhaps the most obvious
is to treat the economy with the highest level of productiv-
ity in a particular industry as the frontier. For each industry
we can thus calculate an economy’s level of productivity
relative to the productivity leader. The greater the distance
between any one economy’s level of productivity and that
in the leading economy, the greater the potential for
technology transfer.
Measuring relative levels of productivity can be done in the
same way as measuring productivity growth – by compar-
ing the relative levels of output to relative levels of factor
inputs, where factor inputs are weighted appropriately. In
practice, though, a number of different measures are possi-
ble, depending on exactly how the inputs of the factors of
production are calculated and on the assumptions made
about market structure. So we looked at four different
measures of rates of growth and relative levels of productiv-
ity; these are listed in Table 2 (below) alongside the
assumptions they reflect (e.g. how skilled the workforce is).
Where does R&D come in?
We measured R&D activity in each industry by the ratio of
R&D expenditure by business to total output. In order to
assess the contribution of this R&D activity to both
innovation and technology transfer we looked at the growth
in productivity as a function of several factors – including the
level of R&D spending and the productivity gap. We allowed
the effect of the gap to be different for industries with
different levels of R&D spending. Our results were striking:
n R&D does generate productivity growth through innova-
tion and so R&D activity has a direct effect on rates of
productivity growth. 
Table 2: Four alternative measures of TFP
Each takes a different measure of inputs into the production 
process and makes a different assumption about market structure 
(a) Market structure: perfect competition 
Labour input: hours worked
Capital input: no correction for degree of capacity utilisation
(b) Market structure: perfect competition
Labour input: hours worked adjusted for skill composition of the workforce
Capital input: no correction for degree of capacity utilisation
(c) Market structure: imperfect competition
Labour input: hours worked adjusted for skill composition of the workforce
Capital input: no correction for degree of capacity utilisation
(d) Market structure: perfect competition
Labour input: hours worked adjusted for skill composition of the workforce
Capital input: correction for degree of capacity utilisation
Innovation is important. But productivity improvements can also come from imitation or
technology transfer (between firms or economies), and indeed may be a more important
source of such improvements for economies not at the technological frontier. 
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n Productivity growth was higher when the level of produc-
tivity in the leader was high relative to an economy’s own
productivity, suggesting a role for technology transfer and
convergence within the OECD economies. 
n No matter what the size of the productivity gap, it has a
greater effect on rates of productivity growth when R&D
activity is high. 
For all four of our measures of productivity growth in Table
2, we found that R&D investment plays an important part in
stimulating both innovation and technology transfer. This
provides clear support for the idea that there is an impor-
tant second role for R&D in enabling firms and individuals
to understand and assimilate existing technologies. Studies
that focus solely on the innovative role of R&D investment
are therefore likely to underestimate the true benefits of
R&D in countries which are not technological leaders.
Trade matters too…
Of course, many other things can affect productivity in
addition to R&D. Trade, for example, can stimulate faster
innovation or learning in a number of ways. Imports from
the technological leader will provide new knowledge
embodied in the most technologically advanced new
machines. Lowering tariffs would increase trade and
product market competition and thus force firms to adopt
best practice in order to survive. Increased trade with the
less developed nations might also push developed
countries into putting more effort into innovation to help
preserve their competitive edge.
We found clear evidence that trade matters in addition to
technology in stimulating productivity growth. Countries
which were more open (especially to the technological
leader) caught up faster. But the main benefits from trade
came from the increased pressure to adopt best and most
efficient practices – not because it stimulated firms to work
harder to innovate. Higher R&D spending was what provided
firms and economies with new products and processes. 
Human capital is important too. As one might expect (and
as other studies have shown) those countries which have
invested more in schooling tend to absorb new technolo-
gies more quickly than countries with lower levels of educa-
tional investment and attainment. 
So why isn’t everybody doing it?
Our research provides compelling evidence that globalisa-
tion and innovation are important. More spending on R&D
can help economies catch up with the technological
leaders as well as pushing forward the technological
frontier. There are clear benefits in terms of productivity
growth and therefore economic welfare. So why isn’t
business in countries like Britain, which lags behind in the
productivity race, spending far more on R&D?
The answer isn’t all that hard to find. As Flaubert remarked
in his dictionary “Inventors – They all die in the hospice.
Somebody else profits by their discoveries; it is
not fair.” The benefits of R&D are often not
enjoyed by those who do most of the work.
But this applies much more in the case of
R&D aimed at innovation. R&D
which is intended to help firms
catch up with their competitors
does bring direct benefits to
those who invest in it. There
ought to be a big private incen-
tive for companies to invest in
this area of R&D.
That firms don’t do more of it,
therefore, is more likely to
reflect the difficulty of raising
sufficient finance or the lack of
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The main benefits from trade came from the increased pressure to adopt best and most
efficient practices – not because it stimulated firms to work harder to innovate. 
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the appropriate skills necessary to take advantage of the
knowledge gained through R&D – or both. In order to try to
tackle the financing gap, the British government is consid-
ering the introduction of R&D tax credits for those small
firms where the financial problems are thought to be great-
est. It has also encouraged various schemes to aid the
start-up of high tech companies. But the amounts on offer
are small: £150m has been earmarked, compared with total
R&D spending of £7 billion a year. Large firms account for
the overwhelming bulk of R&D spending.
A solution for Britain?
But directing taxpayers money directly at R&D may not be
the best solution. Government efforts may be more effec-
tively directed at improving the skills infrastructure. The UK
regularly comes near the bottom of the league tables of
developed countries in mathematics and sends fewer of its
young people to college than the USA, for example. The
best policy for encouraging technological advancement,
and thus productivity growth, is more likely to be by
improving the skills level of the workforce from which firms
have to draw. 
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Countries which have invested more in
schooling tend to absorb new technologies
more quickly than countries with lower levels
of educational investment and attainment. 
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Has the employment contract had its day?
This summer, the European Commission published the findings 
of the Supiot inquiry into the reform of European employment 
law. It recommended developing intermediate forms of contract
between the ‘standard’ employment relat ionship and 
self-employment. David Marsden of the CEP reflects on the Supiot
report recommendations and explores how the development of new
contractual forms could release potential reserves of economic
activity and help tackle unemployment.
Breaking the link
E
mployment laws do not create jobs.’ Such is
the conventional wisdom of the last two
decades – a view apparently reinforced by the
OECD. When they examined the international
evidence as to whether different types of
policies have any effect on jobs and labour
market performance, OECD economists concluded that it
was, at best, uncertain. So it’s puzzling that the European
Commission study group on employment patterns and the
reform of labour law should have placed so much emphasis
on the need to reform the basic principles on which labour
law has been built over the last half century. Or is it? When
we examine the group’s findings more closely, there’s a
good case for saying that this collection of leading labour
lawyers, led by Alain Supiot, has shown considerable
insight. Instead of looking at individual employment promo-
tion policies, we need to look at the nature of the legal
employment relationship itself. This institutional innovation
laid the basis for the huge expansion of economic activity
this century, but it may now have outlived its usefulness.
Revisiting the employment contract
Currently, nine out of ten workers in OECD countries are
engaged as employees with contracts that are open-ended
both in the nature of the work covered and the duration of
the contract. Of the other 10% of workers, some are
classed as self-employed, and others are on various forms
of ‘non-standard’ employment contract. Most part-timers
also have open-ended contracts. 
Yet such open-ended contracts weren’t always the norm. In
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, various
forms of labour sub-contracting were widespread, and
depending on the country, it has really only been since the
second world war that this form of legal employment
relationship has consolidated its pre-eminence. The open-
ended contract has brought many advantages for employ-
ers and employees alike. These benefits have not been
unqualified, however, and they may now be outweighed by
the disadvantages. Analysis of the costs and benefits of this
particular employment relationship can point the way to
more productive forms of job creation. 
The conventional employment contract is a remarkable
social and economic institution, as important as the inven-
tion of limited liability for companies. It solves a very difficult
economic question: how to enable open-ended cooperation
between self-interested parties – workers and employers –
given that each knows more than the other about important
aspects of their joint work, and that the gains from coopera-
tion also imply costs of separation. 
Sub-contracting had worked well when the outcomes could
be easily defined and monitored. But it reached its limits as
technical change and the increasing complexity of produc-
tion meant firms wanted more direct control over the work
process and to tailor work tasks more closely to their own
organisational needs. To do this, they needed a new
contractual form: the open-ended employment relationship.
Overcoming suspicion
For workers who distrusted the intentions of potential
employers, an open-ended contract would have seemed a
recipe for exploitation: and so it only became acceptable as
various protections were incorporated into it. Coase
captured its essence: writing in 1936 he noted that the
open-ended contract gave employers the authority to define
workers’ tasks ex post ‘within certain limits’. Coase recog-
nised that these limits could not be set by exhaustive job
descriptions with complex contingency clauses. Apart from
the cost of writing such contracts, they would not work
because their very detail would create endless scope for
job-level bargaining. The solution that gradually emerged
was to use certain kinds of work rules to identify the limits
of managerial authority and of employees’ obligations. 
To be effective, such rules have to be simple enough to be
understood and applied by ordinary workers and their line
managers, far from the help of personnel departments and
legal advice. The earliest such rules tended to identify
certain kinds of work tasks. One such rule was the ‘work
post’ rule commonly applied in French and American
patterns of bureaucratic work organisation, as in mass
production and large offices, and which assigns an 
individual worker who is held responsible for them.
Another approach has been to identify the scope of jobs
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In the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, various forms of labour 
sub-contracting were widespread.
‘
by taking the tools or materials associated with certain
tasks, as was common under British and American craft
demarcation rules. Although bureaucratic work organisa-
tion was originally a management idea, the work posts very
quickly transformed into a defensive mechanism for
workers. Defining people’s jobs also makes clear the limits
on their obligations. 
For mutual benefit
In more recent years, work rules have increasingly focused
on the function rather than the individual task, but while
more flexible, they also require higher levels of trust and
more complex relationships between work groups and
management. Well-known examples can be found both in
the flexible work organisation patterns of large Japanese
firms, where the ‘competence ranking’ rule often guides the
distribution of tasks within work groups, and in the ‘qualifi-
cation’ rule, which assigns work broadly according to its
skill requirements, as is common in Germany. Both these
approaches establish a much looser relationship between
individual tasks and workers’ jobs: they improve the flexibil-
ity with which tasks are accomplished, but they do so by
focusing on functions related either to production needs or
to workers’ skills. These rules help restrain exploitation by
either workers or employers, and so make the open-ended
employment relationship a viable and attractive form of
contract. Labour law and collective agreements have
helped reinforce these work rules.
Institutionalising the employment relationship in this way
has enabled modern firms to develop the organisational
potential which has contributed so much to the economic
expansion of the last hundred years. It has enabled the
development and mobilisation of human skills and organisa-
tional capabilities in a way that the sub-contracting systems
of the nineteenth century could not.
Time to move on?
Supiot and his EU colleagues think that both firms and
workers have now exhausted the potential of the open-
ended employment relationship. The strains can be seen in
two ways. Firms need to be increasingly flexible in the way
they are organised, so that they can respond to swiftly
moving markets and technical change. At the same time,
piecemeal attempts to adapt the standard employment
relationship by introducing a wide range of special types of
employment contract – such as youth contracts, employ-
ment and training contracts – have made labour rules more
complex and so harder to enforce while not generating
extra jobs on the scale anticipated.
It’s difficult at present to work out what is actually happen-
ing. We know from a range of case studies that firms are
experimenting with new ways to organise themselves:
network organisations, project-based work, and even re-
creating market conditions within the firm itself. Firms also
want to be able to move into and out of certain activities,
which means radical changes to the structure of their
workforces and the skills required of them. At the same
time, workers, aware of these rapid changes, feel more
insecure, and believe that the implicit contract of long-term
employment has been eroded. Paradoxically, however, job
tenures have remained remarkably stable; nine tenths of
OECD workers continue to be engaged as employees in the
conventional open-ended contract; and there has been no
clear or uniform international trend towards greater self-
employment.
So what is happening? 
No doubt part of the explanation is that the case studies are
unrepresentative, and the aggregate statistics are measur-
ing the wrong things. But it is also possible that the conflict-
ing evidence reveals a pent-up demand from firms, at least,
for more flexible employment forms that cannot be satisfied
by either the standard employment relationship or by
current forms of self-employment. At present, employment
offers firms the flexibility of ex post definition of work but the
protections deprive them of the flexible organisational struc-
tures they seek. Self-employment offers them the latter kind
of flexibility, but at the considerable cost of needing to
define work tasks ex ante. The middle ground between the
two is also unsatisfactory because it fails to provide either
party with the flexibility and protections they need. Opening
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Firms need to be increasingly flexible 
in the way they are organised, so that they 
can respond to swiftly moving markets 
and technical change.
up the middle ground is partly a question of labour law and
social insurance, and partly one of appropriate work rules.
The Supiot report argues that firms and workers are held
back from more flexible contractual forms because the
protections provided by labour law hinge mainly upon the
‘standard’ open-ended employment relationship, as do the
protections offered by our social insurance systems.
Frequent job changing is heavily penalised both by limited
access to employment rights, which usually depend on
the length of time a worker has been in a job, and
reduced pension rights. Supiot and his colleagues have
therefore been exploring other forms of employment
relationship that would support shorter duration jobs, and
even multiple job holding, thus enabling both firms and
workers to develop more fluid, short-term relationships.
‘Activity contracts’ are one such option: these would
extend employment and social security rights to a much
wider range of activities than traditional employment, such
as approved voluntary and domestic work. They have also
considered the Italian legal concept of ‘para-subordina-
tion’ whereby a person works (part-time) for several
employers simultaneously, but this is classed as continu-
ous employment for the purposes of employment rights
and social protection.
The need for new rules
Work rules hold the key to regulating new forms of open-
ended employment contracts. Little is gained if the new
employment forms push firms back towards ex ante defini-
tion of work tasks and their outputs, and by and large firms
have not opted for the self-employment option although it
has long been available. Work rules can link workers’ abili-
ties and firms’ job requirements in one of two ways: they
either take job demands and form worker skills around
them, or they take workers’ skills as given and organise
work accordingly. 
Starting with the demands of the job tends to be the way
many firms have been traditionally organised: it is this
approach which may now have outlived its usefulness -
even in the more flexible Japanese-style work systems.
Alternatively, working with the skills available has been
characteristic of occupational labour markets, and it is likely
to be much easier to adapt this approach to the more flexi-
ble organisational structures many firms are now seeking.
Indeed, when British shipbuilding was at its peak, it was
organised on what in modern parlance is a ‘project basis’ -
workers were hired specifically for each new ship. This was
possible because of a system of craft labour markets which
regulated both training and work organisation. If we look at
those areas where self-employment has grown in Britain it
has tended to be either for casual labour, or where there
are professional or craft skills. This, of course, has echoes
of the craft system of nineteenth century Britain. 
The more unusual examples of Hollywood and Silicon Valley
illustrate how reputation within an occupational community
fulfils many of the same functions as long term employment
with the same firm. There are two reasons for the success of
occupational and kindred skills in this area. First, they enable
workers to move between firms and work assignments more
easily without a drop in pay. Second, the skill itself and the
craft and professional norms learned during training play a
key part in regulating work content and work quality.
Although the use of expert knowledge creates an information
asymmetry between the firm and the professional worker -
the worker knows more about his or her skills than the firm -
this is partly remedied by the similarity of skills between
workers in the same occupation so that firms can learn what
to expect from those holding a given qualification.
The new-look labour market
Expanding this middle ground, the areas of economic activ-
ity which fall somewhere between traditional employment
and self-employment, means broadening the protections of
labour law and social insurance as the Supiot report
advocates. But we need also to look closely at the develop-
ment of new forms of occupational markets which make
workers rather than jobs the bearers of skills. This appears
to be the most promising way of releasing firms’ pent-up
demand for more flexible organisation structures and more
flexible forms of contracting while at the same time offering
the prospect of additional job creation. Institutional reform
could open up scope for a new economic expansion. It may
even offer an alternative path back to long-term full employ-
ment without excessive reliance on ‘McJobs’.
Institutionalising the employment relationship
in this way has enabled modern firms to
develop the organisational potential which 
has contributed so much to the economic
expansion of the last hundred years.
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t’s difficult to read a newspaper or turn on the TV these
days without being reminded that the crime rate is
rising. Of course, journalists love crime stories – they
help sell newspapers – and they are prone to exagger-
ate. But even the Home Office figures show that over a
very long period of time, crime rose steadily in Britain –
even when you allow for the fact that criminal activity varies
with the business cycle. From the late 1970s onwards, the
increase was particularly rapid, though it has begun to fall
since the mid-1990s.
When they are not actually reporting crime, the newspa-
pers and broadcast media tend to spend a good deal of
time trying to come up with explanations for its increase.
Unemployment, social alienation and TV violence have all at
various time been put forward as theories. But these are
often only theories: many armchair pundits don’t bother to
look for evidence to support their pet thesis. We decided to
look at some hard data to test one specific hypothesis: that
there is a link between low wages and low growth in wages
and rising crime. Police force data in England and Wales
provide evidence to support the idea of a link between
more rapidly rising property crime and declining labour
market opportunities.
Spotting the trend
There are striking – and surprising – international differ-
ences in the incidence of crime and its trend. One recent
study showed unexpected differences between the pattern
of crime in England and Wales and that in the United
States. According to police statistics and victim surveys,
overall crime rates are actually higher in England and
Wales. Robbery, assault, burglary and car theft are all
higher according to 1995 victim surveys. The notable
exception to this pattern involves some crimes against the
person: the US murder rate is much higher (six times as
high in 1996, for example). Even here, England and Wales
are catching up. The murder and rape rates rose in the US
in the 1980s and 1990s: but they rose even faster in
England and Wales between 1981 and 1996, thus narrow-
ing the gap. And property crimes fell in the US over this
period, while continuing to rise in England and Wales.
The economic theory of crime
The standard economic approach to crime is a simple
one. It states that individuals weigh up the expected costs
and benefits from crime, taking into account the probabil-
ity of being caught, and participate in illegitimate activities
only if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs. If
an individual is making a choice between work or crime it
is clear that a crucial factor will be the level of wages he
or she could obtain.
We know from well-documented evidence that the gap
between the more highly paid and the lowest paid
workers has widened rapidly since the late 1970s. The
wages on offer in many new jobs have worsened,
suggesting deteriorating labour market prospects for
recent entrants, particularly the less skilled. Joblessness
among low-skilled workers has also risen. These factors
have combined to produce significantly worsening labour
market opportunities for people at the bottom end of the
wage distribution. According to the economic models,
these worsening wage opportunities would lead to a 
rise in the crime rate. We set out to see if that is 
what happened.
Does crime
pay better?
New research at the Centre for Economic Performance suggests 
a link between low pay and property crime. Stephen Machin and
Costas Meghir explain.
by Stephen Machin and Costas Meghir
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Evidence for the prosecution
We began by looking at police force area level data between
1975 and 1996. We concentrated on property crime: this is
the sort of crime most likely to correspond with the
economic models of crime. Other sorts of recorded crime,
such as crimes against the person, often have other motiva-
tions which aren’t associated with monetary gain. On the
incomes side of the equation, we looked at data on hourly
wages for workers at the bottom 10% of the wage distribu-
tion: those people most likely to be making the crime-work
choice at the margin will be those on low wages. 
Figure 1 (below) reports what happened to property crime
rates between 1975 and 1996. They rose for most of the
period, and then started to fall in the mid-1990s. Despite this
decline at the end there is nevertheless a large net increase,
up from around 24 crimes per 1000 people in 1974 to
around 70 crimes per 1000 people by 1996. 
Figure 2 (below) shows the (by now) well-known story about
wages at lower points in the wage distribution falling behind
those higher up the distribution. It shows wage changes
(indexed at 1 in 1975) for a person 10% from the bottom of
the wage distribution (the 10th percentile), someone in the
middle (the 50th percentile), and someone 10% from the top
(the 90th percentile). It is very clear that, since the late
1970s, the 10th percentile worker’s wage has grown by less
than either of our examples higher up the distribution. 
A clearcut case?
So far so good. We know crime rates rose. We know wage
inequality rose. But these findings don’t tell us whether the
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Figure 1: Property Crime rates in England and Wales, 1974-96
Source: Criminal Statistics.
Note: Property Crime rates are
defined per 1000 people
Source: New Earnings Survey
microdata for all workers England 
and Wales.
Note: All percentiles are indexed 
at 1 in 1975
Police force data in England and Wales provide evidence to support the idea of a link between 
more rapidly rising property crime and declining labour market opportunities.
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two developments are linked. We want to know whether
the rises in crime were most pronounced in those areas
where wage inequality also rose more sharply. Figure 3
(above) shows that by using geographically based data we
can demonstrate the link. Those areas with lower than
average wage growth in the bottom tenth percentile were
also those areas with the largest rises in crime. Worsening
wages for low-paid workers do therefore seem to go hand-
in-hand with rising crime.
Of course, we then tested this finding, a basic negative
correlation, to a rigorous statistical testing procedure. We
used statistical models that allow us to control for differen-
tial conviction rates (to net out differences in the impact of
deterrence across areas), previous crime rates (to net out
persistence in crime within areas due to peer group or
neighbourhood effects) and estimates of the returns to
crime. The basic relationship remains: crime rates went up
by more in those areas where wage prospects at the
bottom end of the wage distribution deteriorated the most.
The models got it right
Economic models of crime that emphasise the role of
market wages in the incidence of crime are therefore
clearly in line with the experience in England and Wales
since the mid-1970s. Property crime rose by more where
wage opportunities declined by more. This reinforces the
view that what happens in the labour market is important in
explaining why individuals turn to crime in the absence of
anything better. A buoyant labour market with good wages
on offer at all points on the income distribution could there-
fore be central in reducing the potentially large social costs
of crime. Our findings present a significant challenge to
policymakers – those concerned with the labour market and
those concerned with crime prevention.
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According to the economic models, these worsening wage opportunities
would lead to a rise in the crime rate.
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xceptions arise, of
course. Take growth and
inequality. A long-
standing conventional
wisdom on trade-offs is
that economies grow
faster when inequality is higher. There
was then a choice. Was it better to
shake out the inefficiencies in the
workings of your society, and watch
the economy grow – but as a result
face the possibility that incomes
across individuals become more
unequal, for those same inefficiencies
had been hiding who was performing
well and who wasn’t? Or was it
preferable to bump along the bottom,
but with society strictly egalitarian?
Reality has turned out to be more
nuanced. There are societies that
have been able to grow rapidly, but at
the same time have maintained
equality across their inhabitants. Then
there are countries like China, the
UK, and the US that – at least in
popular understanding – have seen
rapid growth but with inequality risen
dramatically. (To complicate the
issue, it must also be said that even
as Chinese society became more
unequal through the 1980s, its high
Danny Tyson Quah
Economics is about trade-offs, mostly. 
When economic science has added most
memorably and enduringly to public policy and
debate, it has done so by taking a cold hard
look at who has had to give up what for whom
in return for how much. No free lunches. 
A wide-eyed approach
to life of trying to 
be all things to
everyone might make
for good politics. It 
is almost never ever
good economics, 
says Danny Quah.
Going cheap on 
the Net: get your
trade-offs here
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rate of economic growth did
successfully bring hundreds of
millions of people – many times the
UK population – out of absolute
poverty.) And there are countries that
not only have failed to grow but have
seen inequality increase as well – an
outcome that smacks not only of
profound tragedy but of sheer
carelessness. 
In my last column I commented on
greater information dissemination,
and how that might be used to get
around incentive difficulties in the
production and distribution of
knowledge-goods in the weightless
economy. But if economics is about
hard choices, where are the
weightless economy trade-offs?
On the one hand this,
on the other hand that
One abiding myth about Internet and
e-commerce development – parts of
the weightless economy if anything is
– is that they are indubitably good
things. We worry only that there’s not
yet more Internet use and e-
commerce; we fret about how to pay
for further subsidising their
development: building public Internet
kiosks, wiring up all the nurseries in
the land, ensuring Internet access to
anything that so much as fogs up a
mirror held to its nose, whether or not
it’s wanted. According to this view,
the infrastructure surrounding the
knowledge-based, weightless
economy is a classic public good,
and we have nowhere near enough
infrastructure.
Another abiding myth is that the
opposite is true. All this internet
business is just a waste of time. We
were much more productive and
better off hammering out heavy-metal
technology, and we should have kept
doing it. Software commodities and
Internet use comprise a bill of goods
that has been foisted on us by vested
interests – who have become
grotesquely wealthy due to the
ineptitude of the masses. (And this is
not even to mention spiritual frivolities
like Tomb Raider, Doom, or Webbie
Tookay.) We don’t like email and
instant communications, and Web
surfing just diminishes us. Whatever
is valuable and endures should be
done slowly with no more than pen
and paper, or otherwise carried in
heavy bags along the high street. Just
look at how productivity worldwide
trudged downcast for decades while
software and information technology
developments galloped on ahead.
Unless an economy has already been
downright careless with its
resources, any reallocation and
adjustment brings costs and benefits.
(Have there been economies thus
careless? Well, some economists
seem to think that countries in the Far
East and elsewhere that have
undergone currency crises are in
exactly such a state. Why else could
so many policy recommendations be
so unequivocal?) The right view, in
normal circumstances, isn't whether
more Internet use and e-commerce
development, greater software,
music, and video entertainment
proliferation are good things or bad
things. The right question, instead, is
where is that trade-off of costs and
benefits?
Where should the societies we live in
choose to situate along that frontier
of possibilities? Unthinkingly
repeating myths seems to me a pretty
good way of never finding out
answers to these questions.
Information, information
everywhere
All the information that we generate,
inadvertently, when we participate in
the knowledge-driven economy can
be used to help get around
inefficiencies in the workings of the
weightless economy. This seems an
unalloyed good thing. If anything,
since there are likely to be associated
positive network externalities, quite
probably we are not sufficiently
promiscuous with our personal data,
and should be encouraged to reveal
even more information. Perhaps, as
some web-service firms now do, the
government could pay everyone to
surf the Web more, and openly so.
But does it raise issues on the other
side of the trade-off? 
Stepping outside economics, social
observers have no difficulty
answering Yes to this question. In
their view, information promiscuity
ought to engender wide public
concern and debate: loss of privacy,
compromised national security,
infringed civil liberties, surveillance by
a (potentially oppressive) police-state.
As recent events in Central Europe
and the Far East have demonstrated,
such fears are not unfounded. 
These are large political and ethical
questions, and an economic analysis
of them would be appropriate. But
this isn't the place for that. Instead, I
want to consider here a much
smaller, preliminary question that
when pushed might get us eventually
to such an investigation. As previous
columns have emphasised, a
constant tension in all activity that
produces infinitely-expansible
information is that between ex-ante
incentives and ex-post efficiency.
Formal organisations for intellectual
property – patents, copyrights, trade
secrets – acknowledge this, and
settle on some transient ex-post
inefficiency, through monopoly
operation, in exchange for some 
ex-ante incentive provision. 
When we generate information by
leaving electronic footprints through
websurfing or DNA traces through
medical examination, the activity is, in
essence, also creation of intellectual
property. We might not have to strain
as hard as scientists in a genetics
research laboratory or a
mathematician developing a new
encryption algorithm, but that is
irrelevant. (And who knows, they’re
probably having fun as well doing
what they do.) Recognising the
positive benefits of our handing over
that private information is, in one
sense, the same as acknowledging
the social efficiencies that would
materialise from weakened intellectual
property rights. Where relevant, the
same economics should apply.
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Our collective heritage?
A poster child for these weightless-
economy tensions can be seen in the
pattern of ongoing developments in
DNA and genetic research
worldwide. If there is doubt that the
latter are, indeed, part of the
weightless economy, consider the
following hypothetical example.
Whatman PLC is a firm that
specialises in "separations
technologies". In June 1999, its
market value doubled in three
working days, and has since
continued to rise. The reason for
this? Whatman had applied for
patents on how genetic material is
stored; in particular, it then had
perfected a reliable technology for
storing human DNA – our constant
companion, the ubiquitous bitstring –
on a piece of paper. Previously, the
most widely-used method involved
blood samples in large refrigeration
units, an expensive and irrelevant
technology when what is essential is
underlying information sequence. As
throughout the previous columns, it is
not the storage container that
provides value; it is the encoded
weightless data.
Genetic information matters because,
more and more, fresh commercial
development of drugs and
pharmaceuticals relies on accessing
chemical landmarks in a map of
human DNA. Many common but
recalcitrant illnesses – depression,
Alzheimer’s, diabetes, arthritis, breast
and prostrate cancer – are either
suspected or known to have
underlying genetic causes.
Cataloguing the genetic variation
across people is then useful on at
least two fronts. In the small,
medicine can be personalised, with
greater effectiveness due to
treatment being tailored to particular
individuals. In the large,
understanding the linkages between
specific individuals within an entire
population allows faster insight into
the genetic causes of specific
ailments. When an average product
costs US$500m in R&D to bring to
market and creative destruction
relentlessly reduces the duration of
monopoly power, every little
competitive edge helps.
An immediate parallel with software
production becomes apparent: users
and producers meld. People who
draw on the expertise of the drugs-
producing sector supply back their
genetic information for subsequent
improvements of the product. Users
of commercial and GNU software
provide in return data on likes,
dislikes, proclivities for further
refinements on the current release.
But just as scientists, researchers,
and other weightless-economy
produce generators seek
compensation for their activities,
shouldn’t the general public be
similarly rewarded? We have formal
intellectual-property institutions for
the former; what compensates the
latter? What are efficient ways to
organise this generation of
information, genetic or otherwise? 
One argument is that inadvertent
serendipity engenders no explicit
reward. A research scientist or a
software engineer consciously makes
a choice to do something other than
become a financial analyst. If society
did not provide appropriate
incentives, we would run out of such
knowledge-economy producers. On
the other hand, the DNA information
in an individual or across a
population, the oestrogen boosters in
Thai plant roots, fertility hormones in
the urine of European nuns,
contraceptive agents in wild Mexican
yams, are all there by accident – no
one gave up a well-paying job to
generate them. They should,
therefore, form part of the collective
heritage of humanity. There should be
no trade-off between ex-ante
incentive and ex-post efficiency when
we exploit these.
An Icelandic lesson
This reasoning might be fine as a first
organising principle, but the
practicalities of plundering that
common heritage does require messy
apportioning of property rights and
rewards. Iceland has now become a
One abiding myth about Internet
and e-commerce development –
parts of the weightless economy
if anything is – is that they are
indubitably good things. 
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consequences by the provision of large-
scale official financing in the event of a
crisis”. But when the Thai crisis provided
an opportunity to drive that warning
home, the international community chose
once again to provide large-scale
financing. And it has done that repeatedly
– in the Indonesian, Korean,
Russian and Brazilian cases.
Korea’s interbank debt was
rolled over, but that was done
belatedly and with a guarantee
from the Korean government –
which was in turn backed up
implicitly by large-scale official
financing. In short, private-
sector involvement has not yet
been used to substitute decisively for
official funding.
Unfortunately, the G-7 report does not
declare clearly and forcefully an end to
the era of “exceptional” official financing.
When, indeed, it warns that a country
should not expect to obtain large-scale
official financing if it intervenes heavily to
defend a pegged exchange rate, the
report appears to imply that countries
which do not make this mistake can still
expect to obtain it. There is thus no
reason to believe that the Fund and its
key members are ready to forswear the
use of large-scale financing or even to
identify clearly the cases and conditions
in which they will provide it. Unless and
until they do that, a country facing a
currency crisis is apt to draw down its
reserves and hope that its problems will
go away – like Mexico in 1994 and
Thailand in 1997. And the international
community is apt to do the only thing it
can do quickly – furnish large-scale
financing to contain the crisis.
justly-famous example. The natural
experiment that is the genetic makeup
of Iceland’s relatively homogenous
population allows medical insights into
illnesses and cures unavailable
elsewhere. Pharmaceutical companies
and researchers want that national
database set up and accessible. Some
want monopoly rights over those data,
in return for collecting and processing;
others might prefer a joint venture,
possibly with government involvement,
that then releases those data for
widespread use. A number of
Icelanders worry about the firesale on
their individual privacy and their
national heritage.
What is an appropriate, i.e.
economically efficient system of
rewards in such a situation? In all the
argument over the loss of Iceland’s
national identity, individual privacy, the
ethics of state versus individual rights
on information – an argument that a
number of observers suspect will be
replicated as such weightless-
economy activity becomes more 
and more pervasive – the economic
trade-off needs to be clarified and
explained to all.
After Cologne
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